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Abstract
This paper analyzes how the OECD revises potential output (PO) estimates after reces-
sions. We show that downward revisions are substantial and mostly driven by supply shocks
while PO estimates do not significantly react to demand shocks. In addition, revisions are
partly caused by avoidable mismeasurement of PO before recessions. In particular, we show
that the length of the preceding boom and pre-recession values of the current account balance
and credit volumes are predictors of post-recession PO revisions. Our results call for im-
proved methods for estimating PO and provide evidence against the existence of substantial
hysteresis effects of demand shocks.
JEL Classification: E32
Keywords: potential output, trend, output gap, hysteresis, OECD
1 Introduction
Estimates of potential output (PO) are important for decisions about monetary and fiscal policy.
Although PO estimates are meant to proxy the level of economic output that is sustainable in
the long-run and independent of cyclical (demand-driven) fluctuations, they have been revised
downwards in response to the Great Recession for many countries (see, e. g., Benati, 2012;
Ball, 2014). This has renewed interest in the question of how sensitive PO estimates are to
severe economic downturns and which factors might help to anticipate and avoid post-recession
revisions of such estimates.
Against this background, this paper addresses the following research questions: Do recessions
have permanent effects on PO estimates? What are the reasons behind downward revisions of
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comments. Jonas Dovern gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Ministry of Science, Research and the
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PO estimates in the aftermath of recessions? To empirically investigate these questions, we use
a newly compiled data set with real-time vintages of the Economic Outlook (EO) provided by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that allows us to trace
the development of revisions to the level of PO after recessions.
We distinguish between four main explanations why PO estimates are revised downwards
following a recession. If recessions are caused by permanent supply shocks, the revisions are a
reflection of the lower-than-previously-expected long-run output path of the economy (explana-
tion 1). If recessions are caused by demand shocks, revisions of PO estimates would indicate
that the analysts believe that hysteresis effects lead to permanent output effects (explanation
2). If PO is overestimated before a recession, subsequent revisions of PO estimates are “merely”
a correction of previous measurement errors (explanation 3). Finally, causation could run in
the opposite direction, as suggested in Blanchard et al. (2015) and Blanchard et al. (2017). In
this case, declining income expectations induced by the PO revision lead to a fall in aggregate
demand and a recession (explanation 4). Note that in this case, PO revisions should precede
recessions.
Our paper presents two main findings. First, PO is, on average, revised downwards sub-
stantially following recessions. These revisions are partly predictable and, thus, the correction
of avoidable mismeasurement of PO before recessions. Second, most of the downward revisions
are caused by supply shocks while PO estimates do not significantly react to demand shocks.
Our paper is related to a number of strands in the literature. First, it adds to the literature
that investigates the reliability of PO estimates. Starting with Orphanides and van Norden
(2002) and Orphanides (2003), the unreliability of such estimates in real-time is documented
in many studies (see, e. g., Orphanides et al., 2000; Camba-Mendez and Rodriguez-Palenzuela,
2003; Marcellino and Musso, 2011; Jacobs and van Norden, 2016), with Edge and Rudd (2016)
presenting somewhat more optimistic findings for output gap estimates published by the Federal
Reserve Board since the 1990s. A number of contributions suggest broadening the information
set that is used to estimate PO to obtain more stable estimates. Garratt et al. (2008) show
how one can use information from different data vintages and model data revisions explicitly to
obtain more reliable PO estimates. More recently, Borio et al. (2014) and Borio et al. (2017)
suggest using information about the financial cycle to improve estimates. Our paper expands
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on this literature by being the first that documents in detail the (un-)reliability of PO estimates
after recessions and the reasons behind their instability during such periods.
Second, our paper relates to other studies that analyze whether recessions or financial crises
affect potential output (estimates) or the corresponding growth rates. Based on OECD real-
time data for 23 countries, Ball (2014) shows that PO estimates remain permanently below pre-
recession trends after the Great Recession of 2008/09.1 Haltmaier (2012) (using the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter) and Martin et al. (2015) (using exponential trends) use PO estimates
obtained ex post by filtering the most recent data vintage. Both papers find that PO growth
decreases permanently following recessions. Using the production function approach to estimate
PO, Furceri and Mourougane (2012) document a similar effect for the times after financial crises
for a sample of 30 OECD countries. Finally, Benati (2012) uses a structural vectorautoregressive
(VAR) model to provide evidence that PO growth slowed down after the Great Recession in the
United States (US), the Euro area, and the United Kingdom. So far, none of these papers have
used comprehensive real-time data on actual estimates of PO levels.
The lack of use of real-time data is also a shortcoming of the third strand of literature that
our paper relates to. This literature analyzes whether recessions or financial crises affect actual
output or its growth rate. The most notable study in this context is by Cerra and Saxena
(2008), who show that output losses following financial or currency crises are very persistent in
the period between 1960 and 2001. Other studies, such as Papell and Prodan (2012) and Abiad
et al. (2009), confirm these findings. Based on data for 100 financial crises over the last 150
years, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014) broaden the view and show that financial crises have
negative impacts on a wide range of variables, such as asset prices, employment or government
debt. Finally, a number of studies (see, e. g., Hosseinkouchack and Wolters, 2013; Blanchard
et al., 2015) provide evidence that also regular recessions tend to permanently reduce the level
of output.2
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains our data and how we
make PO estimates from different data vintages and for different countries comparable. Section 3
1Using PO estimates from real-time vintages of the IMF World Economic Outlook, Fata´s and Summers (2016)
provide evidence that fiscal consolidations contributed to the decline of PO during this period.
2In a wider context, our paper is related to the literature on macroeconomic hysteresis effects, i. e., the notion
that temporary shocks, such as monetary shocks or demand shocks, might have long-lasting or even permanent
effects on output (Blanchard and Summers, 1986, 1987; Lindbeck and Snower, 1986; Stadler, 1986, 1990). We do
not contribute to the discussion of hysteresis mechanisms. But the latter are one potential explanation for the
downward revisions of PO estimates after recessions that we find in our empirical analysis.
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contains the empirical results of our study. It first presents non-parametric statistics that show
when and by how much PO estimates are revised following a recession. It then provides evidence
about potential causes behind the observed revisions; in particular, it contains evidence that
supply and demand shocks trigger different patterns of PO revisions. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Identification of Recessions
To identify recessions, we rely on the simple and transparent method proposed by Bry and
Boschan (1971), as adapted for quarterly time series by Harding and Pagan (2002).3 We apply
this algorithm to data on real gross domestic product (GDP) from the most recent vintage
of the OECD Main Economic Indicator (MEI) database. In total, we identify 95 recessions
between 1990 and 2017, for which we have corresponding data on PO estimates by the OECD.4
The algorithm is accurate and yields plausible recession dates. For the US, for example, our
recession dating coincides with the business cycle dates provided by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) with respect to both start and end of the recessions.5 The mean
duration of the identified recessions is 4.4 quarters and the maximum loss in output (relative to
the pre-recession peak) is −3.4 % on average.
2.2 Real-Time Data from Economic Outlook
Our main data are different vintages of the EO published by the OECD in spring and autumn
of each year. This source contains macroeconomic data for member states of the OECD along
with forecasts (one and two years ahead) and estimates of unobservables (such as PO) made
by the OECD. We use the OECD data for three main reasons. First, the OECD covers a large
sample of countries for which it produces consistent PO estimates. Second, the OCED uses the
production function approach to estimate PO (see Beffy et al., 2006) which is also widely used
elsewhere. Finally, the availability of real-time data allows us to look at actual revisions of PO
estimates and their timing.
3We require each business cycle phase to last for at least two quarters and each complete cycle (trough to
trough and peak to peak) for at least five quarters.
4We exclude two “recessions” which are identified by the algorithm (Denmark 1990Q3–1991Q4, Iceland
2003Q1–2005Q1) because they are misclassified. For a full list of the recessions, see Table A.1 in the Appendix.
5One exception is the NBER call of a recession in 2001, which is not identified by our algorithm (because it
did not involve two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth).
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Table 1: Sample overview of PO estimates
Country 1st vintage # Vintages Max. sample # Recessions
Australia 1989-1 57 1961 1
Austria 1989-1 57 1961 4
Belgium 1989-1 57 1970 4
Canada 1989-1 57 1962 3
Czech Republic 2005-2 24 1992 2
Denmark 1989-1 57 1960 7
Finland 1989-1 57 1961 4
France 1989-1 57 1963 2
Germany 1994-1 47 1963 5
Greece 1989-2 56 1961 6
Hungary 2008-2 18 1992 2
Iceland 2000-1 35 1964 4
Ireland 1989-1 57 1961 3
Italy 1989-1 57 1960 7
Japan 1989-1 57 1962 7
Luxembourg 2005-2 24 1976 2
Netherlands 1989-1 57 1970 2
New Zealand 1989-1 52 1963 5
Norway† 1989-1 52 1965 4
Portugal 1994-2 46 1960 3
Slovenia 2011-2 12 1999 1
Spain 1989-1 57 1965 3
Sweden 1989-1 57 1964 3
Switzerland 1989-1 57 1961 7
United Kingdom 1989-1 57 1963 2
United States 1989-1 57 1960 2
Notes: “1st vintage” refers to the first vintage from which PO estimates are available. “Max.
sample” notes the first year for which PO estimates are available in at least one vintage. We use
data from the previous vintage to proxy missing vintages in the following cases: Greece (1991–2),
Ireland (1991–1/1991–2), and Switzerland (1994–2). Five vintages of PO estimates are missing for
New Zealand (1994–2 to 1996–2) and for Norway (1991–1 to 1993–1). PO estimates for unified
Germany are not available in vintages before 1994–1. †Data on GDP and PO for Norway refer
to domestic production excluding exploration of crude oil and natural gas, transport via pipelines
and ocean transport.
Our sample of data vintages that contain information about PO estimates ranges from spring
1989 (EO No. 45) until spring 2017 (EO No. 101). It covers the 26 countries which are listed in
Table 1. We have a full set of 57 vintages for 16 of those countries. For Greece, New Zealand,
and Norway, only a small number of vintages is missing.
Our main variable of interest are the OECD’s estimates of PO levels which we denote by y¯.6
In addition, we use information on the level of GDP (y), the current account balance (in % of
GDP), imports and exports (to construct a measure of trade openness), the level of public debt
(in % of GDP), and the public primary balance (in % of GDP) from the EO vintages.
6Note that PO estimates for Norway refer to the level of domestic production excluding exploration of crude
oil and natural gas, transport via pipelines and ocean transport.
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Figure 1: Raw data vintages of PO estimates for the US
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Notes: The plot shows OECD estimates for (real) PO in the US from different EO vintages. Values are in trillions
of real USD (with different base years).
Because we use real-time data vintages, our data have a multi-dimensional structure. This
allows us to track how the OECD’s PO estimate for any particular year changes across vintages
following the start of a recession. Consequently, we are able to analyze how large revisions are
and when they occur. We denote a variable x for country i and year t from vintage v by xvi,t.
A snapshot of the raw data is plotted in Figure 1 which shows all vintages of PO estimates
for the US. The plot shows that revisions can be substantial. It is also evident from the fig-
ure that we need to normalize the data due to changes in national accounting standards and,
most importantly, base years. This applies to all countries and we explain how we do this in
Section 2.4.
2.3 Extrapolation of Potential Output Estimates
The OECD data contain PO estimates that reach two years ahead of the publication time, i.e., a
vintage v′ from a certain year t′ contains information up to y¯v′i,t′+2. Because we are also interested
in medium-term revisions following a recession and would like to compare how the PO estimates
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for, say, the fifth year after a recession change during the recession and the following years, we
need to extrapolate the raw OECD estimates.
We do so by expanding the OECD estimates for additional 10 years using the implied average
potential growth rate of the last 10 observations (which include the OECD’s forecast for the
next two years). That is, we compute γ = 1/10
∑2
k=−7 ∆ ln y¯
v′
i,t′+k, and obtain additional (log)
PO estimates as ln y¯v
′
i,t′+k = ln y¯
v′
i,t′+2 + (k − 2)γ for k > 2. Since these additional data points
depend on our calculations and are no raw OECD estimates, we indicate below which results
depend on the additional data and which results do not.
Given the high degree of smoothness of PO, our approach is adequate. The fit of a linear
trend through the last 10 observations of the raw PO estimates is very good on average. Looking
at the distribution of the corresponding R2 across all vintages and countries in our sample reveals
a median goodness of fit of above 0.99. In fact, even the 25th percentile of the distribution of
R2s is 0.99 and the 1st percentile is still 0.68. So there is little evidence that our extrapolations
lead to large approximation errors (with respect to the unpublished long-run PO forecasts by
the OECD). In addition, there is little reason to believe that those approximation errors, which
presumably are mainly due to the fact that the OECD could have anticipated demographic
changes in real-time, are systematically related to the occurrence of recessions. Thus, overall,
we are confident that the extrapolation does not systematically affect our results although it
might induces some noise.
2.4 Data Normalization
When comparing PO estimates from different vintages, we have to take into account potential
changes in national accounting standards, base year, and/or unit of measurement (e. g., with
the introduction of the euro). Since for a number of countries there are some vintages with
samples that do not overlap, we cannot use a global base year to normalize all data. Instead, we
use a different normalization for each identified recession, making comparable all vintages that
are relevant for tracing revisions around this particular recession.
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Denoting the first year of a recession by t0 and the first vintage following the start of a
recession by v0, we construct normalized PO estimates using the following formula:
y˜v0+ki,t0+s = y¯
v0+k
i,t0+s
× y
v0
i,t0−s∗
yv0+ki,t0−s∗
, (1)
where k ranges from kmin < 0 to kmax > 0 (determining the range of vintages around a particular
recession that we consider), s ranges from smin < 0 to smax > 0 (determining the range of years
around a particular recession that we consider), and s∗ > 0 determines which year we use as
the base year for the normalization. s∗ needs to be sufficiently large to ensure that already
the earliest vintage considered (v0 + kmin) contains reliable data about GDP in year t0 − s∗;
otherwise, forecast errors made by the OECD or data revisions would influence our results. In
practice, we set s∗ equal to 5.
We apply a second normalization step to make sequences of PO estimates comparable across
recessions and countries. More specifically, we normalize y˜v0+ki,t0+s such that y˜
v0
i,t0
= 100, i. e., the
estimate of PO in the first year of a recession as reported in the first vintage following the start
of the same recession is set to 100.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Timing and Size of Revisions to Potential Output Estimates
We start by tracking how estimates for PO in a certain year evolve across successive vintages
of the EO. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the evolution of PO estimates for the first and
the fifth year following the start of a recession. The solid vertical line indicates the first data
vintage after the start of a recession. It is evident that, on average, PO is revised downwards
in the aftermath of a recession.7 The estimate for the first year after the start of a recession,
for instance, is reduced by roughly 1.7 %, on average, from v0 to v10 (Table 2). Looking at later
years shows that the gap between pre-recession PO estimates and the post-recession estimates
increases with the distance to the recession start. This confirms evidence in Blanchard et al.
7One problematic issue could be the secular decline in trend growth rates in most of the countries in our
sample. If persistently unanticipated by analysts, this might lead to a pattern of downward revisions of PO across
vintages irrespectively of recessions (or any other cyclical phenomena). To check that our results are indeed driven
by the occurrence of recessions and not an “artefact” of this secular trend, we re-produced our results based on
a set of “randomly distributed recessions” (see Appendix B). These results do not exhibit the same patterns (the
interquartile range easily covers the median level from v0 for all years and vintages).
8
Figure 2: Revisions to PO estimates after recessions
(a) First year of recession
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(b) Fifth year after recession start
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Notes: The plots show the revisions to OECD PO estimates for the first/fifth year after a recession start across
different vintages. Values to the left of the dashed line depend on our extrapolation of the PO estimates. The data
are normalized such that the value in the first recession year as estimated in the first vintage following the start of the
recession is equal to 100. The sample includes 95 recessions. Grey shaded areas represent the 5th to 95th percentile
range, the 17th to 83th percentile range, and the interquartile range.
(2015), who call this phenomenon “super hysteresis”. Revisions to PO estimates are made
gradually over roughly five years following the recession; about 2/3 of the revisions are made
until the end of the recession. The pattern of revisions seems to be non-monotonic in the sense
that the initial downward revisions are partly reversed later on: the estimates from v20 are
between roughly 0.9 percentage points (Year 5) and 3.4 percentage points (Year 10) higher than
those from v10.
Interestingly, PO estimates are not revised at all, on average, before the start of a recession.
This can be seen from the stable medians at the left side of both plots (for vintages up to
v0). Thus, the OECD does not anticipate lower long-run PO levels already before recessions.
In essence, this provides evidence against the hypothesis that the causation could run from
downward revisions of PO to recessions (explanation 4).
Another prominent feature of our results is the large variation across countries and recessions.
The band spanned by the 5th and the 95th percentile is large in all cases and ranges from solid
positive numbers to substantially negative ones. After all, the huge variation is not too surprising
given the very different situations of countries when hit by a recession.8 Focusing on the 83th
percentile line shows that it plunges below the median level in vintage v0 between roughly v8
8We come back to this issue in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 where we analyze which factors can be used to
explain differences in the size of PO revisions.
9
Table 2: Change of PO estimates around recessions
Change vs. y˜v0t (in %)
y˜v0t y˜
v−4
t y˜
v−2
t y˜
v2
t y˜
v4
t y˜
v10
t y˜
v20
t
Year 1 100.00 0.38 0.24 −0.81 −0.69 −1.72 −1.59
Year 2 101.99 0.67† 0.33 −1.04 −1.29 −2.35 −1.81
Year 3 104.02† 1.15† 0.38† −1.69† −1.83† −2.78† −2.02†
Year 5 108.67† 0.85† 0.46† −1.92† −2.39† −4.01† −3.07†
Year 10 121.08† 0.87† 0.14† −2.89† −4.01† −6.90† −3.47†
Notes: Full sample median is based on a total of 95 recessions. y˜
vj
t refers to the normalized
PO estimate in a particular year (indicated by the row label) after the start of a recession as
reported in the vintage j relative to recession start. j = 0 refers to the first vintage follow-
ing the start of a recession. Estimates for each recession are rescaled such that y˜v01 = 100.
† indicates that the computation of the result involves our extrapolation of PO estimates.
and v15 in both sub-plots. Thus, although the variation is large, we see a decline of PO estimates
in the vast majority of cases.
To see whether results are heavily influenced by the Great Recession, we also split our sample
into one group of recessions that start during the years 2007–09 and one group consisting of all
other recessions. The results in Appendix C show that—as expected—the median revision of
PO estimates after the Great Recession has been large relative to the historical norm. At the
same time, however, the average downward revisions for the remaining sample is almost as large
as for the full sample, indicating that the identified phenomenon is not a special feature of the
Great Recession and its aftermath.
Another way of presenting the data on PO revisions is to look at the long-run revision made
to estimates for several years around the start of a recession. Figure 3 shows that the revisions
made to PO (over a span of ten years) for years far after the start of a recession are indeed much
larger than for the first recession year. In addition, the data show that post-recession revisions
are also made to PO in the years before recessions. PO for the fifth year before a recession,
for instance, is revised downwards roughly 1 % on average. Thus, because the OECD uses an
estimation approach which is implicitly two-sided, it revises its PO estimates even for the decade
before a recession.
What is a benchmark against which to compare the timing and size of the revisions? We
compare how the revisions made by the OECD (using its preferred production function approach)
relate to results one would have obtained in real-time if one had applied a simple statistical filter
to GDP data (incl. the OECD growth forecasts) to estimate PO for each data vintage. We use
the one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (see, e. g., Stock and Watson, 1999) for such a purely
10
Figure 3: Post-recession revisions to PO estimates for different years around recession start
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Notes: We compare PO revisions between the first and the 20th vintage after the recession start. In the Box-
Whisker plot, the Whiskers include the 5th to 95th percentiles. The boxes correspond to the interquartile range and
the medians are indicated by the lines.
statistical approach. We then extrapolate and normalize these alternative PO estimates in the
same way as described in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
It turns out that both size and timing of the OECD revisions are very similar to those
which would have resulted from an application of the one-sided HP filter in real time—with the
exception of estimates for the first year of a recession (Figure 4). The left plot indicates that five
years after a recession started, the OECD, on average, revised downwards their estimate of PO
in the first recession year by about 2 percentage points more than the application of the HP filter
would suggest. The difference can be explained as follows: As seen above, the OECD implicitly
applies a two-sided filtering method that causes the weak economic development during and
after a recession to lower the trend estimate also for previous years. In contrast, the one-sided
HP filter is only backward looking and estimates of PO in past years do only change due to data
revisions. This becomes also evident if we compare the OECD revisions to those based on the
two-sided HP filter which, on average, are more or less identical.
For the subsequent years, we do not observe remarkable differences between the size of the
OECD’s revisions and those based on the HP filters (results for the fifth year after a recession
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Figure 4: Comparison of OECD revisions to those based on the HP filter
(a) First year of recession
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(b) Fifth year after recession start
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Notes: The plots show the median revisions to PO estimates for the first/fifth year after a recession start across
different vintages based on the one-sided HP filter. Values to the left of the dashed line depend on our extrapolation
of the PO estimates. The data are normalized such that the value in the first recession year as estimated in the
first vintage following the start of the recession is equal to 100. The sample includes 95 recessions. Grey shaded
areas represent the 5th to 95th percentile range, the 17th to 83th percentile range, and the interquartile range. For
comparison, we show the median based on the two-sided HP filter and the OECD median revisions (from Figure 2).
start are shown in the right plot of Figure 4).9 The only observable difference is that the
revision process at the OECD seems to be slightly more sluggish than that based on the filtering
techniques, which can be explained by a smoothing tendency known from the macroeconomic
forecasting literature (see, e.g., Nordhaus, 1987; Dovern and Weisser, 2011; Dovern et al., 2015).
Overall, this suggests that a naive application of simple filtering techniques would speed up the
revision process but would not change the size of revisions in the long-run.
3.2 Predictors of Potential Output Revisions
Now that we have established that PO estimates are, on average, substantially revised down-
wards following the occurrence of a recession, it is of interest whether we can identify predictors
of the size of these revisions. In the long term, this might help to improve the estimation of PO.
We analyze the issue by regressing the size of the PO revision for a particular year (e.g., the first
year of a recession) on a number of macroeconomic variables that might potentially correlate
with our dependent variable. Thus, we reduce our data to a cross-sectional structure, in which
every recession constitutes one observation.
9Results for other years look similar (in terms of the similarity of OECD and HP revisions) to those shown for
the fifth year following the start of a recession.
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More formally, we run regressions of the form
∆y˜v
′→v′′
i,t0+s = βXi,t0 + εi,t0+s, (1)
where ∆y˜v
′→v′′
i,t = ln y˜
v′′
i,t − ln y˜v
′
i,t denotes the revision of PO in country i for year t from vintage
v′ to vintage v′′, Xi,t0 is a vector of covariates, β is a parameter vector of suitable dimension,
and εi,t0+s
iid∼ N(0, σ2) is an error term. We consider the following variables as elements of Xi,t0 :
To characterize the nature of the recession and the previous boom, we include the length of the
recession (in quarters), the depth of the recession (in % of the peak level of GDP), the length of
the previous boom (in quarters), and the revision of PO in the first year of the recession made
during the two years before the recession (in %). To measure a country’s connectedness to the
global economy, we include a pre-recession measure of trade openness (defined as the sum of
exports and imports over GDP), the pre-recession value of an index of financial openness (Chinn
and Ito, 2006), the pre-recession values of measures of exchange rate stability and monetary
independence (Aizenman et al., 2013), and the change of the current account balance (relative
to GDP) over the two years before the recession (in percentage points). To measure the financial
situation of the public sector and the private credit cycle, we include (net) public debt in the year
before the recession in relation to GDP (in %), the public primary balance in the year before the
recession in relation to GDP (in %), and the change in the ratio of credit to the non-financial
sector to GDP over the two years before the recession (in percentage points).10 Finally, we
include a number of indices measuring different aspects of economic flexibility and institutional
quality (the economic freedom score from heritage.com, the World Bank’s ease-of-doing-business
index, and two OECD measures of the strictness of employment protection laws).
We present results for s = 0 and s = 4, i.e., we look at revisions of estimates for the first
and the fifth year after a recession has started. In both cases, we look at revisions between the
first vintage after the recession start and five years later (v′ = v0 and v′′ = v0 + 10).
The estimates in the left part of Table 3 indicate that the size of the post-recession revision
to PO in the first recession year is significantly correlated with a number of factors. While we
test the significance of parameters in single blocks of variables in the first five specifications, we
focus here on a discussion of correlations that remain significant in the final specification (5),
10We obtain credit data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
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in which we include only those variables that are significant in the group-wise regressions. The
depth of a recession seems to be a good predictor of subsequent revisions of PO, the elasticity
being 0.22 and highly significant. We find also a linkage between pre-recession credit booms
and current account changes to subsequent PO revisions. In the latter case, a 1 percentage
point deterioration of the ratio of the current account to GDP goes along with an increase of
PO revisions by 0.26 percentage points. One interpretation of the latter result is that current
approaches for estimating PO attribute substantial fractions of booms fueled by foreign credit
to the structural ability of a country to sustain a certain output level—making later downward
revisions of PO necessary.11 A credit boom during the run-up to a recession is associated, on
average, with a larger downward revision of PO. In line with results presented by Gadea Rivas
and Perez-Quiros (2015), the linkage between credit booms and post-recession PO revisions
disappears if we control for the Great Recession (see Appendix C), suggesting that this factor
is only relevant if recessions fall together with turning points of pronounced financial cycles.
Finally, we find a weakly significant correlation between the degree of employment protection
for workers with temporary contracts and PO revisions, suggesting that stricter employment
protection is associated with smaller downward revisions of PO.12 Overall, the explanatory
variables explain 44 % of the variation of the size of PO revisions for the first year of a recession.
Turning to the estimates for the post-recession PO revisions for the fifth year after the start
of a recession shown in the right part of Table 3 reveals that we are able to explain a slightly
higher share of the variance in this case. Interestingly, the set of significant predictors is very
similar. The only differences are, first, that the length of the previous boom is a significant
predictor of post-recession revisions of PO which suggests that undue optimism spreads the
longer a boom lasts (the longer the boom the stronger the following downward revisions) and,
second, that the OECD employment protection indicator does not significantly predict post-
recession revisions of PO. In addition, we observe that the estimated elasticities are stronger in
all cases. In particular, the elasticity with respect to the depth of a recession is roughly 2/3,
indicating that, on average, most of the fall in output during a recession is deemed as permanent
11The recent experience with Greece would be a typical example of this kind. Continuous current account
deficits fueled a boom with a sectoral composition that could not be sustained once capital flows reversed after
2008.
12Note that this coefficient is no longer significantly different from zero once we exclude data from the Great
Recession.
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by the OECD. This high persistence of output losses is in line with findings in Blanchard et al.
(2015).
Overall, the macroeconomic factors that are considered in the regressions are able to explain
a surprisingly high share of the huge variation in the size of revisions across recessions and
countries. The fact that the length of the previous boom, the change in the current account
balance, and the change in the credit volume—all of which are commonly neglected in the esti-
mation of PO—are correlated with post-recession revisions of PO estimates and together explain
around 1/3 of their variation suggests that the latter are partly due to previous mismeasurement
(explanation 3).
3.3 Demand- vs. Supply-driven Recessions
So far, we have not distinguished between different types of recessions. In general, however, we
expect the need to revise downward the long-run potential capacity of an economy to be larger
after a (permanent) negative supply shock than after a (temporary) negative demand shock.
To see whether we can confirm this conjecture based on our data, we first follow Blanchard
et al. (2015) and split our sample of recessions into a group of recessions that are more likely
to be driven by supply shocks and one group of recessions that are more likely to be driven
by demand shocks. Of course, any classification is imperfect. Still, we present results for two
different approaches (both of which we take from Blanchard et al. (2015)) because we think that
they provide interesting tentative insights.
First, we label all recessions as supply-driven that are associated with financial crises as
identified by Laeven and Valencia (2013). Second, we label all recessions as supply-driven
that are associated with an increase of inflation in the first year of the recession (relative to
the previous year). The idea here is that only supply side shocks can lead to a decrease in
production while at the same time increasing the inflation rate.
We focus on the revisions of PO estimates for the fifth year after the recession start. In
Figure 5, we show the baseline results for the full sample together with the medians for the two
sub-samples. We refrain from plotting percentile ranges for the sub-samples because, unfortu-
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Figure 5: Effects of supply-driven and demand-driven recessions
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Notes: The plots show the revisions to OECD PO estimates for the fifth year after a recession start across different
vintages. Financial crises correspond to the 21 crises identified by Laeven and Valencia (2013) which coincide with
our sample. Increasing inflation means that annual inflation in the first recession year is higher than in the previous
year (for 53 recessions). Values to the left of the dashed line depend on our extrapolation of the PO estimates. The
data are normalized such that the value in the first recession year as estimated in the first vintage following the start
of the recession is equal to 100. The full sample includes 95 recessions.
nately, the number of observations is too small to yield meaningful results.13 Instead, we focus
on discussing the general tendency of the results.
The results based on both classification schemes are similar, even though the differences
between the median revisions for the two recession groups differ depending on which classification
we look at. We observe the following set of consistent results. First, we find strong and persistent
differences in the average size of revisions when contrasting recessions that are more likely to be
driven by supply side shocks to those driven mainly by demand shocks. Recessions driven by
supply shocks, on average, are followed by (much) larger revisions to PO relative to demand-
driven recessions. Second, also after recessions that are likely to be driven by demand shocks
the PO revisions are not equal to zero but substantially negative, suggesting that also these
recessions leave permanent scars on estimates of the long-run growth paths. At this point,
we cannot definitely say whether this is due to hysteresis effects and/or supply shocks that
occur also during those recessions. Finally, the fact that the two averages are very similar for
vintages from before the start of the recessions is reassuring in the sense that it indicates that
the differences are truly due to the different types of recessions.
13In general, the variation across recessions is so high that, given our sample size, we do not expect results for
the two sub-samples to be statistically significantly different from each other.
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The fact that PO is also revised downwards following recessions that we label as predom-
inantly demand-driven does not necessarily imply that PO is revised in response to demand
shocks; it could as well be a response to supply shocks that occur simultaneously. To inves-
tigate how PO estimates react to both types of structural shocks, we identify three types of
such shocks and make inference about the impulse responses of PO estimates through local
projections (Jorda`, 2005) of cumulative revisions of PO estimates onto those structural shocks.
We compute labor productivity shocks as in Coibion et al. (2017).14 We identify fiscal
shocks as suggested by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012).15 Finally, we identify monetary
policy shocks based on recursive structural VAR models.16 While the first shock constitutes a
supply shock, the two latter ones are demand shocks. We aggregate all shocks to a semi-annual
frequency to match the frequency of our vintage data. We denote the semi-annual observations
of the three shocks as εlpi,t, ε
fp
i,t , and ε
mp
i,t , respectively. Note that we “flip” the monetary policy
shock so that positive values indicate an expansionary shock.
We compute cumulative revisions of PO estimates as ∆hy˜ti,y(t) = ln y˜
t+h
i,y(t+h) − ln y˜ti,y(t+h),
where y˜ti,y(t+h) denotes, for instance, the PO estimate for country i from the vintage correspond-
ing to the half-year t for the year that includes the half-year t+h.17 ∆hy˜ti,y(t) measures how much
the estimate of PO for the year that lies (approximately) h/2 years ahead is revised between
period t and h vintages later. We look at cumulative revisions because, as shown in Section 3.1,
the revision process seems to be a gradual one. The local projections are given by
∆hy˜ti,y(t) = α
h
i + γ
h
t + β
hε•i,t + e
h
i,t, (2)
14We compute the shocks as the residuals of autoregressive models (of order 4) for the change in labor produc-
tivity (that we obtain from the OECD).
15Using information from the EO data vintages, we compute the shocks as the difference between observed
government spending (consumption plus—when available—investment) and the level that was expected half a
year before.
16As in Coibion et al. (2017), we include real GDP growth, inflation, the unemployment rate and the short-term
interest rate at a quarterly frequency (that we obtain from the OECD), using data from 1980Q1 until 2017Q1 or
as available and assuming a VAR(4) specification.
17Note that the “target year” changes only every second time as we increase the horizon in steps that are
determined by the semi-annual frequency of our vintage data.
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Figure 6: Response of PO estimates and GDP forecasts to selected structural shocks
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Notes: The plots show the IRFs of (cumulative) revisions to OECD PO estimates and GDP forecasts to selected
structural shocks. The dashed lines indicate 90% confidence intervals and are computed based on +/− 1.645 standard
errors.
where we include country and time fixed effects. The sequence of βhs provides the impulse
response functions (IRF) of cumulative PO revisions to the different shocks.18 For comparison,
we run the same regressions for revisions of GDP forecasts.19
Figure 6 shows the results for horizons up to h = 6. As expected, PO estimates seem to
respond positively to productivity shocks. In contrast, we do not find any significant responses
to the two demand shocks; neither fiscal nor monetary policy shocks seem to systematically
move PO estimates during subsequent years. Hence, in terms of PO level estimates we cannot
confirm the “over-cyclicality” in response to demand shocks that Coibion et al. (2017) report
for PO growth estimates. We find almost unchanged results if we exclude data from the years
2007–09 to check if our results are driven by the Great Recession (see Appendix C).
Comparing the IRFs for PO and GDP forecasts, we see that GDP forecasts tend to react
stronger to productivity shocks relative to PO estimates. For the two demand shocks we do
not find any differences. Here, also GDP forecasts do not significantly react to the shocks. The
insignificant responses of GDP forecasts to both fiscal policy shocks and monetary policy shocks
suggest that either the OECD does not believe that they have any effect on GDP in the short-
term or the OECD is not able to observe those shocks in real time.20 Given how difficult it is
18We also run the same regressions including additional lags of the structural shocks. The corresponding IRFs
are almost unchanged and the conclusions do not change at all.
19Because we do not extrapolate these forecasts, the maximum h that we can consider in this case is rather
low.
20A third explanation is, of course, that our approaches for estimating these shocks yield estimates that are
subject to high measurement errors that make it difficult to identify the IRFs.
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to estimate policy impulses in real time, we think that the second explanation is probably the
most likely one.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed how OECD estimates for the level of PO are revised in the
aftermath of recessions. We view these estimates as representative for a wide range of PO
estimates published and used by policy institutions. We document that they tend to be revised
downwards substantially and broadly in line with results obtained by simple statistical filters.
The revisions occur gradually over a period of approximately five years following the start of
a recession. In addition, we find that revisions after supply-driven recessions are larger, on
average, than those after recessions that are likely to be mainly triggered by adverse demand
shocks. Since we do not find a significant response of PO estimates to structural demand
shocks, we conclude that the PO revisions following demand side recessions are most likely
due to simultaneous adverse supply shocks. Overall, the results suggest that permanent supply
shocks (explanation 1) are more relevant for the PO revisions than demand shocks that lead to
hysteresis (explanation 2).21
We identify a number of variables that have predictive power for the size of post-recession
PO revisions. The correlation of revisions with pre-recession credit booms, the current account
development and the length of the preceding boom suggest that a substantial part of the observed
post-recession revisions is due to a previous underestimation of the boom/overestimation of PO
(explanation 3); in fact, these variables explain around 1/3 of the variation of post-recession PO
revisions. For our sample of PO estimates, we find no evidence that revisions to PO Granger
cause recessions (explanation 4), rejecting the hypothesis of Blanchard et al. (2017) that “the
anticipation of a less bright future is leading to temporarily weaker demand” (p. 639).
Our results have important policy implications. On the one hand, in the light of post-
recession revisions to PO estimates, monetary and fiscal policy have to consider that the need
for stimulative action after economic crises is smaller than indicated by pre-recession estimates.
On the other hand, if very deep economic crises lead to substantial permanent output losses (as
suggested by the large explanatory power of the recession depth for subsequent PO revisions),
21Please note the possibility that other types of demand shocks, which we do not consider here and which might
lead to hysteresis effects, could be relevant during some recessions.
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there would be a strong case for more aggressive stabilization policy during economic crises
to mitigate the detrimental long-run effects (see also Erceg and Levin, 2014; Blanchard et al.,
2015; Gal´ı, 2016). In fact, Romer and Romer (2017) show that stabilization policy can help to
mitigate the long-term effects of financial crises.
Our findings suggest a number of directions for future research. First, it would be interesting
to look at the size and timing of post-recession revisions to estimates of the components of
PO, i. e., potential labor input, the capital stock, and the trend of total factor productivity.22
This would be informative about the mechanisms through which macroeconomic shocks lead to
permanent output effects and could help developing future macroeconomic models. Second, the
effect of macroeconomic stabilization policy during recessions on their long-term PO effects—
similar in spirit to the analysis for financial crises in Romer and Romer (2017)—requires a
thorough investigation that is beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, there seems to be room for
improving the approaches that are used to estimate PO; taking a broader set of macroeconomic
indicators into account could potentially lead to more stable estimates that are less prone to
revisions. A first attempt into this direction has been made by a number of papers that try to
identify unsustainable growth episodes by taking financial data into account when estimating
PO (see, e. g., Borio et al., 2014, 2017). Our results support this idea. In particular, they
suggest that taking data on international capital/trade flows into account can help to improve
PO estimates.
References
Abiad, A., Brooks, P. K., Tytell, I., Leigh, D., and Balakrishnan, R. (2009). What’s the
damage? Medium-term output dynamics after banking crises. IMF Working Papers 09/245,
International Monetary Fund.
Aizenman, J., Chinn, M. D., and Ito, H. (2013). The “impossible trinity” hypothesis in an era of
global imbalances: Measurement and testing. Review of International Economics, 21(3):447–
458.
Auerbach, A. J. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012). Measuring the output responses to fiscal policy.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2):1–27.
Ball, L. M. (2014). Long-term damage from the Great Recession in OECD countries. European
Journal of Economics and Economic Policies, 11(2):149–160.
22Note that this is (not yet) possible based on the EO data because the number of vintages that contain such
information is relatively small since the OECD started to include these variables not before the mid 2000s.
21
Beffy, P.-O., Ollivaud, P., Richardson, P., and Se´dillot, F. (2006). New OECD methods for
supply-side and medium-term assessments: A capital services approach. OECD Economics
Department Working Papers 482, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Benati, L. (2012). Estimating the financial crisis’ impact on potential output. Economics Letters,
114(1):113–119.
Blanchard, O. J., Cerutti, E., and Summers, L. (2015). Inflation and activity – Two explorations
and their monetary policy implications. NBER Working Papers 21726, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
Blanchard, O. J., Lorenzoni, G., and L’Huillier, J.-P. (2017). Short-run effects of lower pro-
ductivity growth. A twist on the secular stagnation hypothesis. Journal of Policy Modeling,
39(4):639–649.
Blanchard, O. J. and Summers, L. H. (1986). Hysteresis in unemployment. NBER Working
Papers 2035, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Blanchard, O. J. and Summers, L. H. (1987). Hysteresis in unemployment. European Economic
Review, 31(1-2):288–295.
Borio, C., Disyatat, F. P., and Juselius, M. (2014). A parsimonious approach to incorporating
economic information in measures of potential output. BIS Working Papers 442, Bank for
International Settlements.
Borio, C., Disyatat, F. P., and Juselius, M. (2017). Rethinking potential output: Embedding
information about the financial cycle. Oxford Economic Papers, forthcoming.
Bry, G. and Boschan, C. (1971). Cyclical Analysis of Time Series: Selected Procedures and
Computer Programs. NBER Books. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Camba-Mendez, G. and Rodriguez-Palenzuela, D. (2003). Assessment criteria for output gap
estimates. Economic Modelling, 20(3):529–562.
Cerra, V. and Saxena, S. C. (2008). Growth dynamics: The myth of economic recovery. American
Economic Review, 98(1):439–57.
Chinn, M. D. and Ito, H. (2006). What matters for financial development? Capital controls,
institutions, and interactions. Journal of Development Economics, 81(1):163–192.
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., and Ulate, M. (2017). The cyclical sensitivity in estimates of
potential output. NBER Working Papers 23580, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Dovern, J., Fritsche, U., Loungani, P., and Tamirisa, N. (2015). Information rigidities: Com-
paring average and individual forecasts for a large international panel. International Journal
of Forecasting, 31(1):144–154.
Dovern, J. and Weisser, J. (2011). Accuracy, unbiasedness and efficiency of professional macroe-
conomic forecasts: An empirical comparison for the G7. International Journal of Forecasting,
27(2):452–465.
Edge, R. M. and Rudd, J. B. (2016). Real-time properties of the federal reserve’s output gap.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 98(4):785–791.
Erceg, C. J. and Levin, A. T. (2014). Labor force participation and monetary policy in the wake
of the Great Recession. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46(2):3–49.
22
Fata´s, A. and Summers, L. H. (2016). The permanent effects of fiscal consolidations. NBER
Working Papers 22374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Furceri, D. and Mourougane, A. (2012). The effect of financial crises on potential output: New
empirical evidence from OECD countries. Journal of Macroeconomics, 34(3):822–832.
Gadea Rivas, M. D. and Perez-Quiros, G. (2015). The failure to predict the great recession: A
view through the role of credit. Journal of the European Economic Association, 13(3):534–559.
Gal´ı, J. (2016). Insider-outsider labor markets, hysteresis and monetary policy. Economics
Working Papers 1506, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Garratt, A., Lee, K., Mise, E., and Shields, K. (2008). Real-time representations of the output
gap. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4):792–804.
Haltmaier, J. (2012). Do recessions affect potential output? International Finance Discussion
Papers 1066, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Harding, D. and Pagan, A. (2002). Dissecting the cycle: A methodological investigation. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 49(2):365–381.
Hosseinkouchack, M. and Wolters, M. H. (2013). Do large recessions reduce output permanently?
Economics Letters, 121(3):516–519.
Jacobs, J. P. and van Norden, S. (2016). Why are initial estimates of productivity growth so
unreliable? Journal of Macroeconomics, 47(Part B):200–213.
Jorda`, O. (2005). Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projections. American
Economic Review, 95(1):161–182.
Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2013). Systemic banking crises database. IMF Economic Review,
61(2):225–270.
Lindbeck, A. and Snower, D. J. (1986). Wage setting, unemployment, and insider-outsider
relations. American Economic Review, 76(2):235–39.
Marcellino, M. and Musso, A. (2011). The reliability of real-time estimates of the euro area
output gap. Economic Modelling, 28(4):1842–1856.
Martin, R. F., Munyan, T., and Wilson, B. A. (2015). Potential output and recessions: Are we
fooling ourselves? International Finance Discussion Papers 1145, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1987). Forecasting efficiency: Concepts and applications. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 69(4):667–674.
Orphanides, A. (2003). Monetary policy evaluation with noisy information. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 50(3):605–631.
Orphanides, A., Porter, R. D., Reifschneider, D., Tetlow, R., and Finan, F. (2000). Errors in
the measurement of the output gap and the design of monetary policy. Journal of Economics
and Business, 52(1-2):117–141.
Orphanides, A. and van Norden, S. (2002). The unreliability of output-gap estimates in real
time. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(4):569–583.
23
Papell, D. H. and Prodan, R. (2012). The statistical behavior of GDP after financial crises and
severe recessions. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 12(3):1–31.
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2009). The aftermath of financial crises. American Economic
Review, 99(2):466–72.
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2014). Recovery from financial crises: Evidence from 100
episodes. American Economic Review, 104(5):50–55.
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2017). Why some times are different: Macroeconomic policy
and the aftermath of financial crises. NBER Working Paper Series 23931, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
Stadler, G. W. (1986). Real versus monetary business cycle theory and the statistical charac-
teristics of output fluctuations. Economics Letters, 22(1):51–54.
Stadler, G. W. (1990). Business cycle models with endogenous technology. American Economic
Review, 80(4):763–778.
Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W. (1999). Forecasting inflation. Journal of Monetary Economics,
44(2):293–335.
24
Appendix A List of Identified Recessions
Table A.1: Identified recessions
# Country Start Length Depth # Country Start Length Depth
1 AUS 1991q1 2 −1.46 49 GRC 2007q3 26 −27.46
2 AUT 1992q4 2 −0.54 50 GRC 2014q4 4 −2.37
3 AUT 2001q1 2 −0.37 51 HUN 2008q3 7 −7.68
4 AUT 2008q2 5 −5.09 52 HUN 2012q1 2 −2.42
5 AUT 2012q2 4 −0.97 53 IRL 2008q1 8 −10.66
6 BEL 1992q2 4 −2.88 54 IRL 2012q3 3 −1.73
7 BEL 2001q1 4 −0.38 55 IRL 2017q1 2 −2.15†
8 BEL 2008q3 4 −3.83 56 ISL 2000q4 2 −1.47
9 BEL 2012q2 4 −0.80 57 ISL 2008q1 9 −15.29
10 CAN 1990q2 4 −3.43 58 ISL 2012q1 2 −2.25
11 CAN 2008q4 3 −4.48 59 ISL 2017q1 2 −1.82†
12 CAN 2015q1 2 −0.36 60 ITA 1992q2 6 −1.50
13 CHE 1990q3 4 −1.22 61 ITA 1998q1 4 −0.60
14 CHE 1992q2 3 −1.70 62 ITA 2001q2 4 −0.73
15 CHE 1995q1 2 −0.44 63 ITA 2003q1 2 −0.61
16 CHE 1996q2 2 −0.50 64 ITA 2008q2 5 −7.95
17 CHE 1998q4 2 −0.27 65 ITA 2011q3 7 −5.20
18 CHE 2002q2 4 −0.87 66 ITA 2013q4 3 −0.19
19 CHE 2008q4 3 −3.37 67 JPN 1993q2 2 −1.35
20 CZE 2008q4 3 −5.80 68 JPN 1997q2 8 −2.40
21 CZE 2012q1 5 −1.92 69 JPN 2001q2 3 −1.91
22 DEU 1995q4 2 −1.05 70 JPN 2008q2 4 −8.67
23 DEU 2001q3 3 −0.48 71 JPN 2010q4 3 −2.65
24 DEU 2002q4 10 −0.51 72 JPN 2012q2 2 −0.86
25 DEU 2008q2 4 −6.93 73 JPN 2014q2 2 −2.03
26 DEU 2012q4 2 −0.67 74 LUX 2008q2 5 −8.40
27 DNK 1992q4 3 −2.04 75 LUX 2011q4 2 −1.87
28 DNK 1997q3 2 −0.30 76 NLD 2008q3 4 −4.52
29 DNK 2001q4 3 −0.24 77 NLD 2011q2 7 −2.04
30 DNK 2006q3 4 −1.05 78 NOR 2002q3 4 −0.81
31 DNK 2008q1 6 −7.07 79 NOR 2008q1 6 −2.70
32 DNK 2011q3 6 −0.50 80 NOR 2010q2 2 −3.52
33 DNK 2015q3 2 −0.55 81 NOR 2015q4 4 −0.80
34 ESP 1992q2 5 −2.81 82 NZL 1991q1 2 −4.27
35 ESP 2008q3 6 −4.62 83 NZL 1997q4 3 −2.18
36 ESP 2010q4 12 −5.72 84 NZL 2000q2 4 −0.90
37 FIN 1990q2 13 −11.90 85 NZL 2008q1 5 −2.61
38 FIN 2008q1 6 −9.97 86 NZL 2010q3 2 −2.38
39 FIN 2012q2 4 −2.63 87 PRT 2002q2 5 −2.41
40 FIN 2013q4 6 −1.69 88 PRT 2008q2 4 −4.33
41 FRA 1992q2 4 −1.14 89 PRT 2010q4 9 −8.06
42 FRA 2008q2 5 −4.00 90 SVN 2011q3 7 −4.64
43 GBR 1990q3 5 −1.99 91 SWE 1991q1 9 −5.55
44 GBR 2008q2 5 −6.13 92 SWE 2008q1 5 −7.43
45 GRC 1990q2 2 −9.44 93 SWE 2011q4 5 −1.17
46 GRC 1992q2 4 −4.69 94 USA 1990q4 2 −1.32
47 GRC 1994q4 2 −0.87 95 USA 2008q1 6 −4.24
48 GRC 2004q4 2 −0.96
Notes: “Length” states the duration of a recession in quarters. “Depth” refers to the deviation from the pre-
recession peak level of output to the trough (in %). † indicates that a recession is ongoing at our sample end.
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Appendix B Simulation based on Randomly Distributed “Recessions”
We randomly select 95 periods across countries and time for which we redo our analysis as
if recessions had occurred in these periods. By repeating this, we create 1,000 data sets of
randomly timed recessions. First, we calculate the median revision and percentile ranges for
each data set. Then, we take the average of all 1,000 median revisions and percentile ranges to
produce the figures below.
Figure B.1: Revisions to PO during random periods
(a) First year of recession
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(b) Fifth year after recession start
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Notes: The plots show the revisions to OECD PO estimates for the first/fifth year after randomly selected periods
across different vintages. Values to the left of the dashed line depend on our extrapolation of the PO estimates. Grey
shaded areas represent the 5th to 95th percentile range, the 17th to 83th percentile range, and the interquartile range,
calculated as means across 1,000 random simulations. For comparison, we show the OECD median based on actual
recessions (from Figure 2).
Figure B.2: Revisions based on the HP filter during random periods
(a) First year of recession
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(b) Fifth year after recession start
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Notes: The plots show the median revisions to PO estimates for the first/fifth year after randomly selected periods
across different vintages based on the one-sided HP filter. Grey shaded areas represent the 5th to 95th percentile range,
the 17th to 83th percentile range, and the interquartile range, calculated as means across 1,000 random simulations.
For comparison, we show the median based on the two-sided HP filter for randomly selected periods and the OECD
median based on actual recessions (from Figure 2); note that values to the left of the dashed line depend on our
extrapolation of the OECD PO estimates.
26
Appendix C Analyses Excluding the Great Recession
Figure C.1: Revisions to PO estimates after recessions excluding the Great Recession
(a) First year of recession
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(b) Fifth year after recession start
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Notes: The plots show the revisions to OECD PO estimates for the first/fifth year after a recession start across
different vintages. We separate the sample into 71 recessions which begin before 2007 or after 2009 and 24 recessions
which start in 2007–09. Values to the left of the dashed line depend on our extrapolation of the PO estimates. The
data are normalized such that the value in the first recession year as estimated in the first vintage following the start
of the recession is equal to 100. For comparison, we show the median based on the full sample. Grey shaded areas
represent the 5th to 95th percentile range, the 17th to 83th percentile range, and the interquartile range for the full
sample.
Table C.1: Determinants of PO revisions excluding the Great Recession
Dependent variable: y˜v101 − y˜v01 y˜v105 − y˜v05
(5) (10)
Recession depth 0.250∗ 0.660∗∗
(1.91) (2.65)
Length of prev. boom −0.015 −0.041
(−0.73) (−1.08)
∆ CA (t-1) 0.324∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗
(2.79) (2.95)
∆ Credit/GDP (t-1) 0.013 −0.012
(0.44) (−0.20)
EP(temp) (t-1) 0.332 0.368
(1.51) (0.89)
Constant −1.483∗∗ −1.710
(−2.54) (−1.55)
N 53 53
R2 0.26 0.33
Notes: We report regressions (5) and (10) from Table 3 for a sample without the
Great Recession. Specifically, we exclude 24 recessions which start in 2007–09. Num-
bers in parenthesis are t-statistics. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to significance levels of
1 %, 5 %, and 10 %, respectively.
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Figure C.2: Response of PO estimates and GDP forecasts to structural shocks excluding the
Great Recession
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Notes: The plots show the IRFs of (cumulative) revisions to OECD PO estimates and GDP forecasts to selected
structural shocks estimated by excluding any data from the years 2007–09. The dashed lines indicate 90% confidence
intervals and are computed based on +/− 1.645 standard errors.
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